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ABSTRACT 
 
David Attewell: Cultural Change and Generational Polarization in European Voting Behavior 
(Under the direction of Gary Marks)  
 
 Recent national elections and referenda in Western Europe have revealed increasingly 
glaring divergences in vote choice between age cohorts. This paper theorizes that differences 
between generations in cultural politics may constitute an explanation for such polarization. 
Analyses of European Social Survey data from 2002 and 2014 reveal that there are indeed 
substantial generational differences in political attitudes on these issues, although it is unclear 
whether these differences are growing over time. Surprisingly, however, I do not find that 
divergent cultural politics generally lead generations to vote for different party families. I find one 
major exception; the youngest generation was increasingly likely to vote for Green parties over 
time, even controlling for an array of socioeconomic and demographic factors.      
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In Britain’s 1975 referendum on membership in the European Economic Community, polling data 
estimated the difference in votes for Remain between the youngest (18-34) and oldest (65+) age 
cohorts at a mere 2 percent (Butler and Kitzinger 1976). By contrast, in the UK’s June 2016 
referendum on exiting the European Union, a chasm separated the young from the old. Only 27 
percent of voters between the age of 18 and 24 years old voted Leave against a full 60 percent of 
voters over 65. Similarly dramatic generational differences appeared in other electoral contexts, 
from the Greek bailout referendum in 2015 (Jurado et al. 2015), to the 2008 U.S presidential 
elections and 2016 Democratic Party primaries (Fisher 2010; Jordan 2016), and the Spanish 
general elections of 2016 (El País 2016). This presents a puzzle: age cohorts are usually cross-cut 
by powerful economic, social, and demographic differences that make it rare to observe such 
extreme divergences in their voting behavior. Explaining their emergence is thus an important part 
of a broader effort to understand party system change in developed democracies. The purpose of 
this paper is to examine cultural politics related to immigration, national identity, gay rights, and 
secularism as a potential source of generational polarization in voting behavior.1  
 
To that end, this paper presents a two-stage analysis of data from the 2002 and 2014 waves of the 
European Social Survey. First, I present evidence that generation helps explain variation in 
                                                 
1 In another paper currently in progress, I look at differences in economic ideology between generations. There is 
some overlap between that paper and this project at the level of general theory about the definition of generation and 
the role of generations in politics. I intend for the two to serve as parts of an ongoing research agenda on 
generational divides and party system change.    
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positions on cultural issues. I then offer analyses showing the impact of generation on the 
likelihood of voting for parties that emphasize cultural issues, namely Green and radical right 
parties. The results suggest that attitudinal differences among age cohorts on issues of cultural 
politics are clear. Surprisingly, however, I do not find evidence that divides on cultural issues are 
leading generations to vote increasingly for different party families. Indeed, I only find clear 
evidence of such generational polarization in vote choice for green parties, for whom the youngest 
group was increasingly more likely to vote relative to their older counterparts.  
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GENERATIONAL DIVIDES IN EUROPE’S CHANGING PARTY SYSTEMS 
 
A rich vein of recent scholarship explores how globalization and cultural change are transforming 
the ideological landscape of advanced industrial democracies (Kriesi et al. 2008; Bornschier 2010; 
Azmanova 2011; Teney et al. 2013, 576). This work describes how these forces have produced a 
new “social conflict”2 between winners and losers of globalization which overlays the traditional 
left/right economic cleavage (Teney et al. 2013, 576). In turn, the increasing salience of this 
conflict fuels the rise of new parties defined by these issues and challenges older parties established 
out of prior historical cleavage patterns (Kriesi et al 2006; Hooghe and Marks 2016).  
 
Scholars have defined generations as being shaped by shared socioeconomic, technological, and 
political experiences during their formative years (Stoker 2014, 378), usually defined as between 
about fourteen and twenty-five years old (Niemi and Hepburn 1995). In terms of culture, we can 
think of each generation as growing up under a different center of gravity: a set of attitudes about 
subjects from religion and homosexuality to national identity that are held by the majority of 
people in society. When individuals pass beyond this stage of life, new shocks and aging affects 
can still change political orientations; but attitudes are generally much more sensitive to 
experiences during formative years than to subsequent ones (Ghitza and Gelman 2014, 8). Even if 
we think of cultural change as relatively continuous rather than punctuated by shocks, political 
socialization of each generation at a different time period is thus capable of creating more 
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homogenous political outlooks and behaviors within cohorts as well as sharper differences 
between them. 
 
Various analyses of cross-sectional survey data have shown that age is correlated with cultural 
conservatism (Cornelis et al. 2008, 53), but age effects would not account for an increasing 
polarization between generations over time. Van der Brug (2010) and Walczak et al. (2012) have 
argued that generational replacement is shifting the determinants of vote choice, with younger 
generations less motivated by class and religious cleavages or left/right ideology than older 
generations. But while immigration has been tentatively mooted as a potential driver of the vote 
choices of the young (Van der Brug 2010, 275), there has been less exploration of attitudinal 
divides on cultural politics between generations, and how this might channel the votes of different 
age cohorts towards specific party families. In other words, do generational differences manifest 
only in terms of which cleavages are salient, or do they propel age cohorts to different sides of the 
new transnational cleavage?  
 
I hypothesize that cohort socialization at different time periods drives divergent reactions to 
processes of secularization, ethnic diversification, and supranational integration. Younger 
generations have grown up with no experience of the world prior to globalization, which greatly 
intensified from the 1990s onwards in terms of economic exchange, political integration, and 
migration flows (Hooghe and Marks 2016). By contrast, Europe’s older generations have seen: 1) 
a political-economic transition from a system dominated by strong nation-states to one 
characterized by free trade and European integration, 2) a demographic transition from relatively 
ethnically and religiously homogenous societies to more diverse ones, and 3) a cultural transition 
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from relatively religious and conservative societies to increasingly secular and liberal ones 
(Inglehart 1990; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Inglehart and Norris 2009).  
  
Attitudes towards issues such as the environment, traditional values, social identity, and national 
authority define what Europeanists have identified as the GAL (green/alternative/libertarian) vs. 
TAN (traditional/authoritarian/nationalist) dimension of political contestation.3 Separate from the 
traditional distributional conflicts between labor and capital which characterized the economic 
left/right divide, this bundle of “new politics” issues has gained prominence since the 1970s,4 
arguably reaching a high point in the era of Brexit. With the available data, it is possible to 
construct a variable which aggregates respondents’ positions on GAL/TAN issues.5 
 
Age cohorts socialized in different time periods are likely on average to have different cultural 
politics, with differences being more glaring the further apart the generations one compares. In 
                                                 
3 Some issues like abortion or gay marriage are fairly intuitively GAL/TAN, insofar as they oppose conceptions of 
individual autonomy against traditional/religious values. Other issues such as immigration and the environment 
obviously have a stronger economic component; nonetheless they can be distinguished from left/right issues insofar 
as 1) they are more salient to green and TAN parties and electorates than to traditional left/right parties and 
electorates, and 2) attitudes related to them correlate more strongly with each other than with traditionally economic 
issues (Walczak et al. 2012).      
    
4 Kitschelt (1994) describes the emerging dimension of “new politics” issues as libertarian vs. authoritarian, Marks 
et al (2006, 157) use GAL/TAN, but both describe similar political phenomena. It is important to note from the 
outset that positions on these issues are assumed to be less congruent than those on the traditional left/right. 
GAL/TAN is thus conceived as a “composite measure”; while the salience of its constituent parts varies across 
countries, the measure provides a useful simplification which captures an important cross-national dimension of 
political contestation.  
 
 
5 There were no questions on the environment which were used across the two waves of survey data examined in 
this paper, so the environmental dimension of GAL/TAN was excluded from my analyses. It is particularly 
interesting that generational differences in voting for the green party were still in evidence despite excluding the 
central issue that generated their emergence in European party systems.   
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combination with the intensification of processes of social change and the rising salience of 
GAL/TAN issues over time, this leads to the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: younger generations are more GAL than older generations.  
 
Hypothesis 1b: age cohort differences on GAL/TAN issues are increasing over time.  
 
In turn, I expect that generational differences on cultural issues drive divergent patterns of voting 
behavior.  
 
Hypothesis 2: younger generations are more likely to vote for parties associated with the GAL side 
of the cultural politics continuum (in Western Europe, this would be most powerfully incarnated 
by Green parties), while older generations are more likely to vote for parties associated with TAN 
positions (particularly radical right parties).  
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DATA AND METHODS 
 
In order to examine generational divisions in cultural politics and their impact on voting behavior 
over time, this paper uses data from the European Social Survey (ESS). Consistent and wide 
country-coverage is a notable advantage of the dataset. The sample of over 20,000 respondents in 
each wave from 15 Western European democracies6 helps us to understand the extent to which 
such age divides are specific to certain country contexts or whether they reflect something more 
fundamental about patterns of political contestation across wealthy European democracies. The 
ESS is also a longitudinal dataset, which allows us to examine the extent to which political 
divisions between generations are strengthening over time.7 This is a key consideration if 
generational politics are to be analyzed as a potential driver of recent party system change.  
 
Dependent Variable  
The ESS is not without its weaknesses, however. Most glaringly, the questions asked vary 
substantially from wave to wave; several which would be particularly useful for the purposes of 
understanding GAL/TAN positions are used in the earliest wave and then dropped. This forces a 
particularly difficult methodological choice as regards the dependent variable. The dependent 
                                                 
6 Specifically, my sample includes Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, 
Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden.  
 
 
7 The ESS is not, however, a panel dataset tracking the same respondents over time. Instead it is constructed out of 
repeated waves of cross-sectional data interviewing a representative random sample of respondents drawn from each 
country.  
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variable is an index variable meant to capture GAL/TAN attitudes somewhat comprehensively. 
But the patchiness of the data imposes a tradeoff. One possibility is to create a relatively rich and 
encompassing dependent variable, but the inconsistency of questions asked over time render it 
impossible to replicate from early to late waves. Alternatively, a dependent variable can be 
constructed which is strictly consistent over the waves, but does not fully capture the spectrum of 
GAL/TAN issues. This paper takes a middle path: extremely similar but not strictly equivalent 
dependent variables measuring GAL/TAN attitudes are constructed for 2002 and 2014, while 
results of models predicting values of a narrower but strictly comparable measure are included in 
Appendix E.     
 
In 2002, my dependent variable ‘Cosmopolitan’ is a summary measure of five questions- each 
measured on a 0-10 scale8 and then averaged- which tap different aspects of GAL/TAN attitudes 
related to immigration, national identity, gay rights, secularism, and supranational integration.9 As 
we see in Table 1a, the components of Cosmopolitan form a scale which is not strongly reliable, 
with a Chronbach’s Alpha of .44. Given the documented role of GAL/TAN attitudes in structuring 
political competition in the literature, however, I consider the use of the instrument to be 
theoretically justified.10  
 
                                                 
8 Variables not originally on a 0-10 scale were first rescaled to this range before being averaged to construct the DV. 
 
 
9 The questions themselves are included in Appendix A.  
 
 
10 A previous version of this paper constructed the dependent variable as a measure which included almost all 
questions in the survey which could bear on cosmopolitanism. However, there were far more questions in the ESS 
related to immigration than to other aspects of cosmopolitanism, which I felt substantively skewed my measure. I 
thus recreated the DV in a way which was more theoretically balanced, even if I sacrifice some reliability.   
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Table 1b below shows summary statistics for Cosmopolitan, while Table 1c compares the mean 
of Cosmopolitan by generation. Before controls, there is a negative, monotonic and statistically 
significant relationship between generation and cosmopolitanism, with each generation after 18-
29 year olds becoming progressively less cosmopolitan. The difference between the mean 
cosmopolitanism of the youngest generation and the oldest generation (over 60s) is almost a full 
point on a 0-10 scale.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1a: Item-Scale Correlations for 2002 Cosmopolitan DV 
 
 
 
 
Table 1b: Summary Statistics for Cosmopolitan 
 
Mean Std Deviation Min Max 
5.67 1.33 .33 10 
 
 
 
Table 1c: Cosmopolitan by Generation in 2002 
 
Generation 18-29 30-44 45-60 Over 60 
Mean 
Cosmopolitan 
(S.E) 
6.02 
(.02) 
5.92 
(.02) 
5.64 
(.02) 
5.05 
(.02) 
 
 
 
Test scale                                                   0.1353      0.4390
                                                                               
transnati~02   23003   +       0.5010        0.1534          0.1605      0.4333
newrlgdgr      25985   +       0.4715        0.1127          0.1809      0.4690
pplstrd10      25847   +       0.6352        0.3245          0.0987      0.3046
newfreehms10   25613   +       0.6092        0.2886          0.1125      0.3364
imwbcnt        25400   +       0.5883        0.2607          0.1229      0.3592
                                                                               
Item            Obs  Sign   correlation   correlation     correlation     alpha
                             item-test     item-rest       interitem
                                                            average
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In 2014, my dependent variable Cosmopolitan2014 is a composite variable constructed using the 
same procedure. The measure includes the same questions on immigration, gay rights, secularism, 
and national identity as in 2002; the only difference is a superior measure of attitudes towards EU 
integration.11 As we see in Table 2a, the Chronbach’s Alpha of Cosmopolitan2014 is .49. Table 
2b contains summary statistics for Cosmopolitan2014. Table 2c shows that age cohorts in 2014 
are also distinct in their cosmopolitanism, and the relationship between generation and 
cosmopolitanism is again negative and monotonic. Since the measures are not strictly equivalent, 
it is not possible to directly test whether such differences in cosmopolitanism in 2002 and 2014 
are statistically significant. Yet it is worth noting that we appear to observe a higher level of 
cosmopolitanism in every generation in 2014 as compared to 2002. The higher Chronbach’s Alpha 
of a scale made up almost entirely of the same questions12 measuring dimensions of GAL/TAN in 
2014 (.49) as opposed to 2002 (.44) may also tentatively suggest that these cultural issues are 
forming an increasingly coherent bundle in political competition.  
 
 
 
Table 2a: Item-Scale Correlations for Cosmopolitan2014 
 
 
 
 
Table 2b: Summary Statistics for Cosmopolitan2014 
 
Mean Std Deviation Min Max 
5.98 1.51 0 10 
                                                 
11 See the appendix for more detail on the specific questions which make up the Cosmopolitan2014 DV.   
12 The one exception is the question measuring transnationalism, as we will see.  
Test scale                                                   0.1624      0.4923
                                                                               
pplstrd10      26637   +       0.6163        0.2992          0.1459      0.4059
newrlgdgr      26549   +       0.4519        0.1090          0.2246      0.5367
euftf          25331   +       0.5743        0.2612          0.1634      0.4386
newfreehms10   26243   +       0.6007        0.2913          0.1513      0.4163
imwbcnt        26148   +       0.6472        0.3579          0.1272      0.3682
                                                                               
Item            Obs  Sign   correlation   correlation     correlation     alpha
                             item-test     item-rest       interitem
                                                            average
11 
 
 
 
Table 2c: Mean Cosmpolitanism by Generation in 2014 
Generation 18-29 30-44 45-60 Over 60 
Mean 
Cosmopolitan 
2014 (S.E)  
6.44 
(.02) 
6.20 
(.02) 
5.98 
(.02) 
5.55 
(.02) 
 
 
Key Independent Variable  
The key explanatory variable of interest is generation, a categorical variable in which the reference 
category is 18-29 year olds. There are any number of ways to cut a continuous age variable, but, 
the key consideration in this paper was to have the youngest group be compact enough that the 
temporal variation in our cross-sectional datasets captures some generational turnover. In other 
words, 18-29 year old respondents in 2002 will all have passed into the generation above by 2014. 
This should roughly allow us to distinguish between age and cohort effects. Coefficients in each 
regression thus give the average change in the dependent variable for 30-44, 45-60, and 60+ 
respondents relative to the youngest group.   
 
Controls 
My model also includes a series of control variables which might also explain variation in 
cosmopolitan attitudes. Rural/urban asks whether respondents live in a big city, suburb of a big 
city, town, village, or in the countryside. I expect respondents living in more rural areas to be less 
cosmopolitan. Education is an ordinal measure of educational attainment which ranges from 
primary education or less to tertiary education.13 Following the literature, I expect education to be 
                                                 
13 For 2014, I recoded the variable edulvlb so that it matched the ordinal categories of edulvla, the measure of 
educational attainment from 2002. These measures should thus be comparable.  
12 
 
positively associated with cosmopolitan values (i.e Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Herreros and 
Criado 2009). Left/right asks respondents to place themselves ideologically from 0 (Left) to 10 
(Right); I would expect that ideology is negatively associated with cosmopolitan attitudes such 
that more right-wing respondents are less cosmopolitan. Occupation is an 8-class schema of 
occupational class from Oesch (2006a; 2006b); following recent work on the role of occupation in 
postindustrial economies, I would expect that socio-cultural professionals would be more 
cosmopolitan than production workers and small business owners, but have no strong priors as to 
other groups. I also control for gender; Female is a dichotomous variable with women assigned a 
value of 1 and men a value of 0. I have no theoretical expectation on how gender should shape 
cosmopolitan attitudes. EconSecurity is an ordinal measure which respondents whether they are 
very comfortable (1), coping (2), having a difficult time (3), or having a very difficult time (4) on 
their income. I would expect EconSecurity to be negatively associated with cosmopolitan values 
such that more economic insecurity should lead to less cosmopolitanism.    
 
Finally, I control for union membership, and having an immigrant father (as a proxy for ethnicity). 
Union is a measure of trade union membership with values of 0 if the person has never been a 
member of a union and 1 if they either currently are a member or have been a member of a union. 
Fathimg asks respondents if their father was an immigrant to their country (1) or not (0). The 
results of these controls will be reported in the appendices only for the sake of parsimony.  
           
Model Specification: Cosmopolitanism over Time 
Our first task is to examine the capacity of generation to explain differences in cosmopolitan 
attitudes in both 2002 and 2014. For this purpose, I employ OLS regression with country fixed 
13 
 
effects; coefficients should be interpreted as the change in the dependent variable for a 1-unit 
increase in the independent variable. To get a sense of the upper limit of generational effects on 
cosmopolitanism, I first use a basic model predicting cosmopolitanism with only generation and 
gender as independent variables.  
 
Model 1a is thus:  
 
Cosmopolitan02= BO+ B1(generation)+ B2(female) 
 
I then include a complete model with controls. Changes in the coefficient and significance of 
generation, as well as the effects of the controls, should give us a sense of through what channels 
gender may affect cosmopolitanism. Model 2b is thus: 
 
Cosmopolitan02=B0+B1(generation)+B2(female)+B3(fathimg)+B4(occupation)+B5(education)
+ B6(left/right)+ B7(EconInsecurity)+ B8(rural/urban)+B9(union).  
 
Model 2, used to analyze the 2014 data is essentially the same, with the exception of the 
substituted educational attainment variable. Again, I use nested models to parse out the channels 
through which generation may impact cosmopolitanism.   
 
Model 2a is thus: Cosmopolitan2014= BO+B1(generation)+B2(female) 
 
Model 2b includes both generation and the full set of controls:  
14 
 
 
Cosmopolitan2014=B0+B1(generation)+B2(female)+B3(fathimg)+B4(occupation)+  
B5(education)+ B6(left/right)+ B7(EconInsecurity) B8(rural/urban)+B9(union). 
 
Finally, a Bruesch-Pagan (BP) test reveals statistically significant heteroskedasticity in both sets 
of data, which I account for by estimating Huber-White robust standard errors, allowing for 
clustering of observations by country. 
 
Model Specification: Generational gaps in vote choice  
After analyzing the extent to which generations drive differences in cosmopolitanism, the key 
question is the extent to which these attitudinal differences lead to differences in vote choice. 
Usefully for my purposes, the ESS asks respondents what party they voted for in their last national 
election. Responses to this question make up the dependent variable: Vote[Party Family].  Parties 
have been coded into party families: 1 represents major right parties, 2 represents major left parties, 
3 represents radical right parties, 4 represents green parties, 5 represents radical left parties, 6 
represents minor liberal parties, and 0 represents other minor parties which do not fit these party 
families.14  
 
I then estimate a logistic regression of generation and a series of socioeconomic, demographic, 
and political control variables on each party family.15 This should give us a sense not only of 
                                                 
14 Party family coding decisions follow a co-authored project with several professors in the department.  I don’t 
knows, non-voters, and refusals are coded as missing data. 
 
 
15 There is a loss of statistical efficiency associated with using separate logistic regressions instead of a single 
multinomial logistic regression. However, I make this sacrifice in return for much easier interpretability of results.  
15 
 
whether generations diverge in their voting behavior, but also of what mechanisms generational 
effects operate through; are younger people more likely to vote for one party family over another 
simply because the younger generation is more diverse, more educated, or self-identifies as more 
left wing? Or do differences in vote choice derive from differences in cosmopolitanism found in 
our OLS regressions?  
In the case of radical right voting, for example, my model would then be: VoteRadRight= 
B0+B1(generation)+B2(female)+B3(fathimg)+B4(occupation)+ B5(education)+ B6(left/right)+ 
B7(EconInsecurity) B8(rural/urban)+B9(union). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
 
RESULTS: PREDICTING GENERATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN 
COSMOPOLITANISM IN 2002 AND 2014 
 
Evaluating Generational Differences in Cosmopolitanism in 2002  
Table 3 below shows OLS regression results for Model1a predicting cosmopolitanism in 2002. 
We can interpret coefficients as the change in cosmopolitanism for a one-unit increase in the 
independent variable. First I run a basic, stripped-down model which predicts cosmopolitanism 
with only generation and gender as independent variables. Model1a finds that the relationship 
between generation and cosmopolitanism is monotonic and negative; 30-44 year old respondents 
are on average .21 points less cosmopolitan than those between 18-29, for example, while those 
over 60 are 1.04 points less cosmopolitan. My results do not find gender to be a statistically 
significant predictor of cosmopolitanism.  
 
Model 2b shows that even controlling for a variety of demographic, political, and economic 
factors, the relationship between generation and cosmopolitanism is monotonic and negative.  
Generational effects are statistically significant at the p=.001 level, so we can reject the null 
hypothesis that generations are no different in cosmopolitanism and our findings are the result of 
random chance. Overall then, this provides evidence for our hypothesis 1a; older generations do 
appear less cosmopolitan than younger generations. The magnitudes of generational effects are 
equal or greater to the strongest effects of many of the socioeconomic controls. Nonetheless, the 
effects of generation do weaken with the inclusion of controls. Some of the variance in 
17 
 
cosmopolitanism which was predicted by generation in our previous model is now explained by 
education, left/right self identification, rural/urban location, and occupational class, controls we 
now turn to.      
 
For the most part, the controls have statistically significant relationships with cosmopolitanism in 
keeping with theoretical expectations.16 Corroborating much of the literature on winners vs. losers 
of globalization, education is positively and statistically significantly associated with 
cosmopolitanism. For example, respondents with a primary education or less are on average .20 
points less cosmopolitan on a 0-10 scale compared with those with a lower secondary education 
(significant at p=.01). At the top end of the range, respondents with a tertiary education are on 
average .37 points more cosmopolitan than those with a lower secondary degree (significant at 
p=.001). Income insecurity is also negatively associated with cosmopolitanism; for example, 
respondents reporting having a “very difficult time coping” with their current income are on 
average .21 points less cosmopolitan than those who report being “very comfortable” on their 
current income.  
 
Living in a more rural environment is negatively associated with cosmopolitanism; for example, 
those living in a small town are on average .25 points less cosmopolitan than those living in a big 
city, while those living in a village are on average .35 points less cosmopolitan. Left/right 
ideological identification is also negatively associated with cosmopolitanism; a one point move to 
the right in self-ID is associated with a .14 point decrease in cosmopolitanism (significant at 
p=.001). Finally, occupational class is also a significant predictor of cosmopolitanism; all 
                                                 
16 Country dummies are included in the model, but results are reported in the appendix, for parsimony.  
18 
 
occupational groups except for small business owners are statistically significantly more 
cosmopolitan on average than the reference category of production workers. Self-employed 
professionals are the most distinct, at .35 points more cosmopolitan than production workers on 
average.  
 
 
Table 3: Regression Results Predicting Cosmopolitanism in 2002 
                                                                            Model 1a              Model 2a  
Ind Var. (reference cat) Coef. (S.E)  Coef. (S.E) 
Generation (18-29)   
30-44         -.21*** 
(.05) 
         -.16** 
        (.05) 
45-60 -.46*** 
(.08) 
         -.33*** 
         (.07) 
Over 60          -1.04*** 
          (.10) 
         -.76*** 
         (.10) 
Female          .05 
        (.03) 
         -.05 
        (.03) 
Rural/Urban (Big city)   
Suburb of big city           -.10* 
         (.04) 
Small town           -.25*** 
         (.04) 
Village            -.35*** 
         (.04) 
Farm/Countryside           -.49*** 
         (.05) 
Education (lower second.)           
<Lower Secondary           -.20** 
         (.05) 
Upper Secondary            .12** 
         (.03) 
Post-Secondary           .20** 
         (.05) 
Tertiary            .36*** 
         (.05) 
Occupation (Production 
Worker) 
  
Self-Employed Professionals          .35*** 
        (.08) 
Small business owners          .07 
        (.07) 
Technical Semi-Professionals          .21** 
        (.06) 
Managers          .32*** 
        (.05) 
Clerks         .15* 
       (.06) 
Socio-Cultural Professionals         .27*** 
       (.05) 
Service workers          .10* 
       (.04) 
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EconInsecurity(Very Secure)   
Coping         -.12** 
       (.03) 
Having Difficulty          -.21** 
       (.06) 
Very Difficult On Pres. Income         .21* 
       (.19) 
Left/Right                 -.14*** 
       (.01) 
Observations 21546       18,467 
R-Squared  .13          .23 
                                   Note: *p=.05 **p=.01 ***p=.001 
 
 
Evaluating Generational Differences in Cosmopolitanism in 2014  
As we see in Table 4, the pattern of generational effects on cosmopolitanism is fairly consistent 
with what we saw in 2002 both before and after controls. Once again, generation is negatively and 
monotonically associated with cosmopolitanism. The effects of being in the 30-44 and 45-60 
groups relatively to 18-29 year olds appear to be somewhat more strongly negative. For example, 
in 2002, 30-44 year olds were on average only .16 points less cosmopolitan than the youngest 
group. Yet in 2014, 30-44 year olds were .32 points less cosmopolitan than the youngest group. 
This may suggest some intensification of generational effects on cosmopolitanism over time. 
However, the effects of being in the 60 and over group on cosmopolitanism, relative to the 
youngest group are virtually the same. Overall all then, I find that evidence for hypothesis 1b- that 
generational differences in cosmopolitanism have grown stronger over time- is mixed.     
 
The effects of our controls on cosmopolitanism have also changed relatively little over time. For 
parsimony’s sake, I will not again describe the size of the effect of each control on 
cosmopolitanism; the direction and significance of the relationships are the same in 2014 as in 
2002. Without making any claims of statistical significance, it is perhaps worth noting that the 
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magnitude of the effects of rural/urban, education, occupation, and economic insecurity on 
cosmopolitanism appear to have grown.   
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Regression Results Predicting Cosmopolitanism in 2014     
                                                                             Model 1b               Model 2b  
Ind Var. (reference cat) Coef. (S.E)  Coef. (S.E) 
Generation (18-29)   
30-44         -.30*** 
(.05) 
         -.32** 
        (.06) 
45-60 -.51*** 
(.09) 
         -.46*** 
         (.09) 
Over 60          -.92*** 
          (.09) 
         -.73*** 
         (.08) 
Female          -.11** 
        (.01) 
         -.18** 
         (.04) 
Rural/Urban (Big city)   
Suburb of big city           -.03 
         (.07) 
Small town           -.17 
         (.08) 
Village            -.34*** 
         (.06) 
Farm/Countryside           -.35*** 
         (.08) 
Education (lower second.)           
<Lower Secondary           -.37*** 
         (.04) 
Upper Secondary            .11* 
         (.04) 
Post-Secondary           .29*** 
         (.05) 
Tertiary            .47*** 
         (.04) 
Occupation (Production 
Worker) 
  
Self-Employed Professionals          .55*** 
        (.08) 
Small business owners          .23** 
        (.05) 
Technical Semi-Professionals          .23** 
        (.05) 
Managers          .35*** 
        (.04) 
Clerks         .27** 
       (.06) 
Socio-Cultural Professionals         .29*** 
       (.05) 
Service workers          .19** 
       (.05) 
EconInsecurity (V. Comfortable)         
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Coping         -.23*** 
       (.03) 
Having Difficulty         -.49*** 
       (.04) 
Very Difficult on Pres. Income         -.63*** 
       (.08) 
Left/Right                 -.14*** 
       (.02) 
Observations 23,925       20,707 
R-Squared  .10          .21 
                                   Note: *p=.05 **p=.01 ***p=.001                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
 
 
 
DIVERGENT ATTITUDES, DIVERGENT VOTE CHOICE? THE IMPACT OF 
GENERATION ON VOTING 
 
So far, we have seen that generations do indeed diverge in their cosmopolitanism. Hypothesis 2 
suggested that these generational differences in cosmopolitanism could drive gaps in vote choice, 
but this has yet to be shown. In order to evaluate hypothesis 2, I estimate logistic regressions 
predicting vote for each party family, first in 2002 and then in 2014. There are six party families 
(radical left, green, center-left, liberal, center right, and radical right), and two different waves. 
Thus, for the sake of parsimony and clarity, complete results for all party families are reserved for 
the appendix. The analysis below will focus instead on the effects of generation on vote choice for 
several party families of theoretical interest.  
 
Predicting Vote Choice in 2002  
If gaps in GAL/TAN attitudes are indeed driving divergent vote choice between generations, then 
we would expect to see this effect be particularly pronounced for parties which identify themselves 
most strongly by GAL/TAN issues, such as the environment, immigration, European integration, 
and social issues. The two party families which form opposing poles on these issues are the greens 
and the radical right.  
 
The Greens 
As we see in Table 5, generation is negatively and monotonically associated with the odds of 
voting for a green party; each successive generation is less likely to vote green than the reference 
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category of 18-29 year old respondents. Figure 1 shows us the marginal probability of voting for 
a green party across generations, holding all other variables at their means.  While millennials have 
more than an 8% probability of voting green, the oldest generation has about a 2% probability of 
doing so.    
 
Table 5: Logistic Regression Results for Voting for a Green Party in 2002               
Ind Var. (reference cat) 
 Coef. (S.E) 
Generation (18-29)  
30-44          -.51*** 
        (.11) 
45-60          -.95*** 
         (.15) 
Over 60           -1.57*** 
         (.20) 
Female          .27** 
         (.16) 
Rural/Urban (Big city)  
Suburb of big city          -.22 
         (.15) 
Small town          -.51*** 
         (.10) 
Village           -.55** 
         (.19) 
Farm/Countryside          -.43 
         (.27) 
Education (lower second.)          
<Lower Secondary          -.61* 
         (.31) 
Upper Secondary           .33** 
         (.06) 
Post-Secondary          .09 
         (.34) 
Tertiary           .52*** 
         (.09) 
Occupation (Production 
Worker) 
 
Self-Employed Professionals         .60 
        (.33) 
Small business owners         .59** 
        (.18) 
Technical Semi-Professionals         .36** 
        (.13) 
Managers         .36 
        (.21) 
Clerks        .37** 
       (.13) 
Socio-Cultural Professionals        1.12*** 
       (.22) 
Service workers         .55** 
       (.18) 
EconInsecurity (V. Comfortable)         
Coping         -.01 
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        (.09) 
Difficult on Present Inc.          .21 
        (.24) 
Very Difficult on Present Inc.        -.07 
         (.33) 
Left/Right       -.37*** 
       (.06) 
Observations       10,574 
Pseudo R-Squared           .20 
                                   Note: *p=.05 **p=.01 ***p=.001 
 
 
Figure 1: Predicted Probability of Voting Green by Generation in 2002 
 
 
 
The Radical Right 
In contrast to votes for green parties, the relationship between generations and probability of voting 
for the far right is far less clear in 2002; no generation is statistically significantly more likely to 
vote for the radical right than the youngest group. The rural/urban divide also does not emerge as 
significant. Less surprisingly, the results suggest that respondents who self-identify further to the 
right on the left-right scale were more likely to vote for a radical right party. In terms of education, 
those with only a primary education were less likely to vote for a radical right party relative to the 
reference category of a lower secondary education, as were those with an upper secondary 
education. Surprisingly, those with a post-secondary education were more likely to vote for the 
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radical right compared to the reference category. More in keeping with the literature, however, I 
find that those with a tertiary education were less likely to vote for the radical right.    
 
 
Table 6: Logistic Regression Results for Voting for a Radical Right Party in 2002 
Ind Var. (reference cat) 
 Coef. (S.E) 
Generation (18-29)  
30-44          .00 
        (.15) 
45-60          -.19 
         (.16) 
Over 60           -.18 
         (.16) 
Female          -.05 
         (.16) 
Rural/Urban (Big city)  
Suburb of big city          .08 
         (.25) 
Small town          -.05 
         (.14) 
Village           -.13 
         (.20) 
Farm/Countryside          -.14 
         (.40) 
Education (lower second.)          
<Lower Secondary          -.54** 
         (.20) 
Upper Secondary           -.33** 
         (.14) 
Post-Secondary          .30 
         (.40) 
Tertiary           -.75* 
         (.34) 
Occupation (Production Worker)  
Self-Employed 
Professionals 
        -.79*** 
        (.28) 
Small business owners         -.51* 
        (.23) 
Technical Semi-
Professionals 
        -.97** 
        (.27) 
Managers         -.70*** 
        (.20) 
Clerks        .-.40 
       (.22) 
Socio-Cultural 
Professionals 
       -1.35*** 
       (.18) 
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Service workers         -.33** 
       (.12) 
Left/Right       .36*** 
       (.02) 
Observations       6,628 
Pseudo R-Squared           .19 
                                   Note: *p=.05 **p=.01 ***p=.001 
Generational Effects for Radical Left, Center Left, Center Right, and the Liberals 
Table 7 seeks to sum up succinctly the age effects across the other party families in 2002, with 
pluses indicating statistically significant positive associations with the probability of voting for a 
given party family, minuses a statistically significant negative association, and 0s no statistically 
significant effect either way.17 Taken together, these results suggest that in 2002, controlling for 
socioeconomic, ideological, and demographic factors, millennials were less likely to vote for the 
center-left than older generations, but more likely to vote for the greens. For the center right, 
liberal, and radical left parties, there are no statistically significant generational effects.    
  
Table 7: Generational Effects for Other Party Families in 2002 
Age Effects  Radical Left Center Left Center Right Liberal  
30-44 0 + 0 0 
45-60 0 + 0              0  
Over 60 0 + 0              0  
Note: These should be interpreted as differences from the reference category of 18-29 year old respondents.  
 
 
Predicting Vote Choice for Greens in 2014 
As we see in Figure 2, the pattern appears even starker in 2014 than in 2002. Holding all other 
variables at their means, the probability of voting green in 2014 was four times higher for 
millennials than for the oldest generation; 12%, in contrast with just 3% for those over 60. This 
second wave also yields the ability to distinguish to a limited extent between age and cohort effects. 
Those respondents in 2014 who are 18-29 are a new generation of young people from those we 
                                                 
17 Again, full logistic regression results can be found in the Appendix.  
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observed in 2002, while the latter generation has moved into the 30-49 category in the intervening 
12 years. In 2014, the predicted probability of voting green (12%) was higher than the 8% 
probability of voting green for the equivalent age group in 2002. In other words, in 2014, young 
people were more likely to vote for a green party than young people were in 2002.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Predicted Probability of Voting Green in 2014 By Generation 
 
 
 
 
 
Predicting Vote Choice for the Radical Right in 2014 
 
In 2014, generations above 44 are negatively associated with voting for the radical right compared 
to 18-29 year olds, but the effects are not statistically significant. Statistically significant predictors 
of radical right voting include male gender, economic insecurity and more right-wing left/right 
self-ID. Primary education or less and tertiary education are statistically significantly associated 
with a lower likelihood of voting for the radical right compared to those with a lower secondary 
education. Finally, all occupational classes are statistically significantly associated with a lower 
likelihood of voting for the radical right compared to production workers.   
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Table 8: Logistic Regression Results for Voting for a Radical Right Party in 2014 
Ind Var. (reference cat) 
 Coef. (S.E) 
Generation (18-29)  
30-44          .25 
        (.28) 
45-60          -.03 
         (.27) 
Over 60           -.05 
         (.24) 
Female          -.31* 
         (.15) 
Rural/Urban (Big city)  
Suburb of big city          .29*** 
         (.07) 
Small town          .23 
         (.14) 
Village           .25 
         (.16) 
Farm/Countryside          .29*** 
         (.06) 
Education (lower second.)          
<Lower Secondary          -.51** 
         (.14) 
Upper Secondary           -.14 
         (.13) 
Post-Secondary          -.29 
         (.26) 
Tertiary           -1.05*** 
         (.17) 
Occupation (Production Worker)  
Self-Employed 
Professionals 
        -1.65*** 
        (.43) 
Small business owners         -1.11*** 
        (.24) 
Technical Semi-
Professionals 
        -.41** 
        (.14) 
Managers         -.90*** 
        (.20) 
Clerks        -.52* 
       (.26) 
Socio-Cultural 
Professionals 
       -1.48*** 
       (.27) 
Service workers         .22 
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       (.22) 
EconSecurity (V Comfortable)  
Coping         .34** 
        (.10) 
Difficult on Pres. Income         .60*** 
        (.17) 
Very Difficult on Pres. Inc.         .90* 
        (.42) 
Left/Right       .29*** 
       (.06) 
Observations       10,582 
Pseudo R-Squared           .15 
                                   Note: *p=.05 **p=.01 ***p=.001 
 
 
Generational Effects for Radical Left, Center Left, Center Right, and the Liberals in 2014 
In Table 9, we see the generational effects on the probability of voting for other party families in 
2014, controlling for the same socioeconomic and demographic variables as before. Voters from 
45-60 and over 60 are more likely than millennials to vote for the center left. While in 2002, 
generation had no statistically significant effect on the likelihood of voting for the center right, in 
2014 those over 60 were statistically significantly more likely to vote for center right parties than 
millenials. Voters from 30-44 are less likely to vote for a liberal party than millennials, while there 
is no statistical difference in the likelihood of voting liberal between 45-60 year olds, over 60s, 
and millenials. Finally, for the radical left, the only change from 2002 to 2014 is that those over 
60 become less likely than millennials to vote for the radical left.  
 
Mixed Generational Effects Over Time 
In sum, then these results provide only mixed evidence for hypothesis 1. Controlling for a variety 
of factors, our results do show clear generational effects on the probability of voting for green 
parties, with younger generations having a higher probability than each generation succeeding it. 
This pattern is even more marked in 2014 than in 2002. Generational effects are also found for the 
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center left, center-right but the differences in voting behavior do not appear to be mostly those of 
the young vs. the elderly, but rather the young and middle aged in contrast to the elderly. 
Furthermore, the 2014 data do not provide evidence for hypothesis 2, that, controlling for possible 
confounders, generational effects on voting behavior are becoming stronger over time.  
 
 
Table 9: Generational Effects for Other Party Families in 2014 
Age Effects Radical Left Center Left Center Right Liberal 
30-44 0 0 0 - 
45-60 0 + 0 0 
Over 60  - + +  0 
Note: Signs should be interpreted as differences from the reference category of 18-29 year old respondents. 
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DISCUSSION 
 
This paper was motivated by the puzzle of increasing generational gaps in voting behavior 
observed in several highly publicized electoral contexts. My theory suggested one explanation 
could be the divergent reactions of difference age groups towards long-term processes of social 
change such as secularization, increased ethnic diversity, and supranational integration. In this 
hypothesis, older generations could be voting for traditional/authoritarian/nationalist (TAN) 
parties as a backlash against the sweeping cultural transformations they have experienced over 
their lifetimes. In turn, younger voters, having grown up in more diverse, liberal, and cosmopolitan 
societies could vote for green/alternative/liberal (GAL) parties in defense of these values. The 
resulting generational sorting would be particularly marked for parties which emphasize issues on 
the GAL/TAN cleavage, namely, green parties on the cultural left and far right parties on the 
cultural right.    
 
The analyses presented here do find an attitudinal divide on cultural issues between age cohorts 
which could serve as the basis for generational differences in voting patterns. Yet, surprisingly, 
our results on generational gaps in voting behavior are much more mixed. For the voters of most 
party families, generational gaps have not become substantially clearer over time. The one major 
exception is the green party; the youngest voters are statistically significantly more likely to vote 
for green parties relative to each successive generation in 2014. Most surprisingly, we do not find 
the same pattern for the other side of the GAL/TAN spectrum; the radical right. Indeed, we are 
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unable to find any statistically significant differences between generations in the probability of 
voting radical right. Why might this be? 
 
I have no clear answers, but some initial thoughts. One potential explanation is the source of 
electoral venue. From Brexit to the Greek bailout referendum, many of the most dramatic electoral 
observations of age discrepancy were referenda. It is possible that something about the binary 
structure of referenda or their relatively high salience makes age gaps more clear than in national 
elections. This could particularly be the case given that young people turn out to vote at lower 
levels than older generations in national elections.18 Furthermore, because the young are already 
relatively low-propensity voters, age gaps tend to become more severe as the overall turnout 
decreases.  
 
Another possibility is that 2014 data may be too old to detect some of the recent watershed 
moments of recent party system change in Europe. The real electoral take-off of parties like the 
Sweden Democrats, AfD in Germany, and the Front National in France came with the advent of 
the Syrian refugee crisis in 2015, while the relative success of far left parties like Syriza in Greece 
and Podemos also came after the intensification of the Eurozone crisis in 2015. These twin crises 
have likely made immigration and EU integration even more salient. More recent data would show 
age gaps in electoral behavior more clearly, as changes in reported vote choice lag the initial causal 
driver of attitudinal differences on the GAL/TAN dimension. Indeed, the next step for my research 
project is to apply the same model to the 2016 round of the ESS, which should be available shortly.   
 
 
 
                                                 
18 Bhatti et al (2012).  
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APPENDIX A: CONSTRUCTING THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES FOR GAL/TAN 
ATTITUDES 
 
To briefly recap, my aim in constructing a dependent variable was to create a summary measure 
which would capture the major dimensions of GAL/TAN attitudes with reasonable reliability and 
replicability across two different temporal cross-sections. Specifically, I wanted to capture several 
policy areas at the core of party competition on these issues: national identity, immigration, 
secularism, transnationalism, and gay rights.19  
 
Both dependent variables were generated by rescaling variables to a 0-10 (if they were not already 
on this scale), and then averaging the resulting scores. My dependent variable for 2002, 
cosmopolitan02, is created using five different measures from the 2002 European Social Survey. 
The first item measures attitudes towards immigration on a 0 to 10 scale, with 0 the most negative 
attitude towards immigration and 10 the most positive. Imwbcnt asks “Do immigrants make your 
country a worse or better place to live?” The second measure Newfreehms10 taps the dimension 
of gay rights, asking respondents if they agree strongly, agree , neither agree nor disagree, disagree, 
or disagree strongly with the statement that “gays and lesbians should be free to live life as they 
wish.” The third item measures conceptions of national identity or community. Pplstrd asks 
respondents if they agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or disagree strongly 
with the statement that “it is better for a country if almost everyone shares customs and traditions”. 
The fourth item is a reverse-recoded variable which measures secularism. Newrlgdgr asks 
“regardless of whether you belong to one religion, how religious would you say you are?”; values 
of 0 correspond to “very religious” while 10 means “not at all religious.” Finally, the last 
                                                 
19 One notable omission enforced by lack of data was environmental issues. 
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component of the DV is an index variable which measures transnationalism. Transnationalism02 
is constructed out a series of reverse recoded questions which measure preferences for the level of 
policymaking—regional/local, national, European, or international-- in order to tap the dimension 
of views towards transnational governance. These variables include transenv (environmental 
policy) transcrm (operations against organized crime), transwlfr (social welfare policy), transaid 
(aid to developing countries), transimg (migration policy), transag (agricultural policy), and 
dclintr (interest rates).     
 
For dependent variable for 2014, cosmopolitan2014, I take the same questions on immigration, 
gay rights, and secularism and add a variable which taps transnationalism in a different way—
attitudes towards EU integration. Euftf asks respondents to place themselves on a 0-10 scale where 
0 indicates “European unification has gone too far” and 10 indicates “European unification should 
go further.” Ultimately then, both measures include items on immigration, gay rights, secularism, 
and support for transnationalism (albeit in different form). The hope is that they can be compared 
despite not being identical measures.  
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APPENDIX B: PREDICTING COSMOPOLITANISM IN 2002, FULL RESULTS WITH 
COUNTRY DUMMIES 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     _cons     6.538578   .1219034    53.64   0.000     6.275222    6.801934
                                                     union     .0355624   .0336269     1.06   0.310    -.0370841     .108209
                                                            
                         Very difficult on present income     -.2051851   .0925639    -2.22   0.045    -.4051572   -.0052129
                              Difficult on present income     -.2111179   .0614602    -3.44   0.004    -.3438946   -.0783413
                                 Coping on present income     -.1165848   .0334036    -3.49   0.004    -.1887488   -.0444207
                                                   hincfel  
                                                            
                                          Service workers      .1042894   .0412186     2.53   0.025     .0152419    .1933368
                      Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals      .2747257   .0516987     5.31   0.000     .1630375    .3864139
                                                   Clerks      .1463431   .0564116     2.59   0.022     .0244732    .2682131
                                     (Associate) managers      .3152118   .0483993     6.51   0.000     .2106514    .4197721
                           Technical (semi-)professionals      .2072894   .0574826     3.61   0.003     .0831057     .331473
                                    Small business owners      .0705221   .0744067     0.95   0.361    -.0902237     .231268
          Self-employed professionals and large employers      .3547157   .0756143     4.69   0.000      .191361    .5180705
                                                  class8_r  
                                                            
                                                   lrscale    -.1340971   .0128874   -10.41   0.000    -.1619385   -.1062556
                                                            
                 Tertiary education completed (ISCED 5-6)      .3553225   .0521233     6.82   0.000      .242717    .4679281
Post-secondary non-tertiary education completed (ISCED 4)      .2005572   .0483388     4.15   0.001     .0961276    .3049869
            Upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3)      .1155833   .0328564     3.52   0.004     .0446014    .1865653
          Less than lower secondary education (ISCED 0-1)     -.2017051   .0463186    -4.35   0.001    -.3017703   -.1016399
                                                   edulvla  
                                                            
                              Farm or home in countryside     -.4850554   .0490266    -9.89   0.000    -.5909709   -.3791399
                                          Country village     -.3457981   .0394647    -8.76   0.000    -.4310564   -.2605397
                                       Town or small city     -.2478443   .0361733    -6.85   0.000    -.3259919   -.1696967
                         Suburbs or outskirts of big city      -.099457   .0362025    -2.75   0.017    -.1776678   -.0212463
                                                   domicil  
                                                            
                                                   fathimg     .0369565   .0527965     0.70   0.496    -.0771035    .1510165
                                                    female    -.0514084   .0331121    -1.55   0.145    -.1229427    .0201259
                                                            
                                                  Over 60     -.7633979   .0950602    -8.03   0.000     -.968763   -.5580327
                                                    45-60     -.3336208   .0703199    -4.74   0.000    -.4855378   -.1817038
                                                    30-44     -.1582739   .0490881    -3.22   0.007    -.2643223   -.0522256
                                                    agecat  
                                                            
                                                       SE      .5652636   .0182126    31.04   0.000     .5259176    .6046096
                                                       PT     -.5215005   .0414897   -12.57   0.000    -.6111335   -.4318675
                                                       NO      .1481495   .0234716     6.31   0.000     .0974423    .1988567
                                                       NL      .3243323    .014218    22.81   0.000     .2936162    .3550485
                                                       IT     -.2006761   .0211397    -9.49   0.000    -.2463456   -.1550065
                                                       IE      .0311676   .0268923     1.16   0.267    -.0269297    .0892649
                                                       GB      .0883796   .0310703     2.84   0.014     .0212563    .1555028
                                                       FI     -.2127466   .0306575    -6.94   0.000    -.2789781   -.1465151
                                                       ES      .1945741   .0200001     9.73   0.000     .1513665    .2377817
                                                       DK      .4205016   .0205295    20.48   0.000     .3761503     .464853
                                                       DE      .2661659   .0248266    10.72   0.000     .2125313    .3198005
                                                       CH      .3434917   .0127549    26.93   0.000     .3159365     .371047
                                                       BE      .1001859   .0151724     6.60   0.000     .0674079     .132964
                                                  cntrynum  
                                                                                                                            
                                             newaddcosmo02        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                           Robust
                                                                                                                            
                                                                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 14 clusters in cntry)
                                                Root MSE          =     1.1507
                                                R-squared         =     0.2309
                                                Prob > F          =          .
                                                F(12, 13)         =          .
Linear regression                               Number of obs     =     18,467
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APPENDIX C: PREDICTING COSMOPOLITANISM IN 2014, FULL RESULTS WITH 
COUNTRY DUMMIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                  
                                           _cons     6.604291   .1159272    56.97   0.000     6.353846    6.854737
                                                  
               Very difficult on present income     -.6335754   .0800774    -7.91   0.000    -.8065722   -.4605787
                    Difficult on present income     -.4888377   .0449074   -10.89   0.000    -.5858543   -.3918211
                       Coping on present income     -.2335837   .0333362    -7.01   0.000    -.3056022   -.1615652
                                         hincfel  
                                                  
                                           union     .0183727   .0331767     0.55   0.589    -.0533011    .0900465
                                                  
                                Service workers      .1874936   .0480569     3.90   0.002     .0836729    .2913143
            Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals      .2875715   .0495443     5.80   0.000     .1805376    .3946053
                                         Clerks      .2682476    .063866     4.20   0.001     .1302734    .4062217
                           (Associate) managers      .3519131   .0430026     8.18   0.000     .2590117    .4448146
                 Technical (semi-)professionals      .2256892   .0548055     4.12   0.001     .1072891    .3440892
                          Small business owners      .2261593   .0542138     4.17   0.001     .1090375    .3432811
Self-employed professionals and large employers      .5518948    .087739     6.29   0.000     .3623462    .7414434
                                        class8_r  
                                                  
                                         lrscale    -.1488625   .0155531    -9.57   0.000    -.1824628   -.1152621
                                                  
                                       Tertiary      .4678029   .0434846    10.76   0.000     .3738601    .5617456
                                 Post-Secondary      .2877768   .0498536     5.77   0.000     .1800747     .395479
                                Upper Secondary      .1068344   .0397686     2.69   0.019     .0209197    .1927491
                                        Primary     -.3738617   .0472667    -7.91   0.000    -.4759752   -.2717482
                                        educ2014  
                                                  
                                         fathimg    -.2964555   .0807089    -3.67   0.003    -.4708165   -.1220945
                                          female     -.175242   .0421438    -4.16   0.001    -.2662881   -.0841958
                                                  
                    Farm or home in countryside     -.3495613   .0751689    -4.65   0.000    -.5119538   -.1871688
                                Country village     -.3048455    .063379    -4.81   0.000    -.4417675   -.1679236
                             Town or small city     -.1686904   .0815643    -2.07   0.059    -.3448993    .0075185
               Suburbs or outskirts of big city     -.0268033   .0746728    -0.36   0.725     -.188124    .1345174
                                         domicil  
                                                  
                                        Over 60     -.7344858   .0788208    -9.32   0.000    -.9047677   -.5642039
                                          45-60     -.4595864   .0899314    -5.11   0.000    -.6538713   -.2653014
                                          30-44     -.3175429   .0589538    -5.39   0.000    -.4449049   -.1901808
                                          agecat  
                                                  
                                             SE      1.291733   .0187912    68.74   0.000     1.251137    1.332329
                                             PT      .4955845   .0222967    22.23   0.000     .4474155    .5437535
                                             NO      .7412147    .021452    34.55   0.000     .6948705    .7875589
                                             NL      .9146693   .0185536    49.30   0.000     .8745866     .954752
                                             IE      .5438962   .0220646    24.65   0.000     .4962284    .5915639
                                             GB      .3578339   .0198958    17.99   0.000     .3148517    .4008162
                                             FR      .5235486    .018535    28.25   0.000     .4835062    .5635911
                                             FI      .4816525    .021647    22.25   0.000      .434887    .5284181
                                             ES      1.113907   .0136921    81.35   0.000     1.084327    1.143487
                                             DK      1.029984   .0250659    41.09   0.000     .9758327    1.084136
                                             DE      .7054706   .0142501    49.51   0.000     .6746852    .7362561
                                             CH      .4674918   .0239257    19.54   0.000     .4158035      .51918
                                             BE      .6638249   .0140623    47.21   0.000     .6334451    .6942047
                                        cntrynum  
                                                                                                                  
                                      addcosmo14        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                 Robust
                                                                                                                  
                                                                     (Std. Err. adjusted for 14 clusters in cntry)
                                                Root MSE          =     1.3405
                                                R-squared         =     0.2129
                                                Prob > F          =          .
                                                F(12, 13)         =          .
Linear regression                               Number of obs     =     20,707
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APPENDIX D: PREDICTING RADICAL RIGHT AND GREEN VOTING IN 2002, FULL 
RESULTS WITH COUNTRY DUMMIES 
 
Radical Right 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     _cons    -4.018273   .2308612   -17.41   0.000    -4.470753   -3.565793
                                                     union    -.0768223   .0923111    -0.83   0.405    -.2577486    .1041041
                                                            
                         Very difficult on present income      .3123645   .4063231     0.77   0.442    -.4840141    1.108743
                              Difficult on present income      .5095809   .1294993     3.94   0.000     .2557669    .7633949
                                 Coping on present income      .1225816   .1006779     1.22   0.223    -.0747435    .3199067
                                                   hincfel  
                                                            
                 Tertiary education completed (ISCED 5-6)     -.7307194   .2948727    -2.48   0.013    -1.308659   -.1527796
Post-secondary non-tertiary education completed (ISCED 4)      .2794704   .3854898     0.72   0.468    -.4760756    1.035016
            Upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3)     -.3205026   .1274204    -2.52   0.012     -.570242   -.0707632
          Less than lower secondary education (ISCED 0-1)     -.6044053   .2053282    -2.94   0.003    -1.006841   -.2019694
                                                   edulvla  
                                                            
                                          Service workers       -.29414   .1127618    -2.61   0.009    -.5151492   -.0731309
                      Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals     -1.315341    .150924    -8.72   0.000    -1.611147   -1.019536
                                                   Clerks     -.4391628    .179388    -2.45   0.014    -.7907568   -.0875687
                                     (Associate) managers      -.703957   .1582501    -4.45   0.000    -1.014121   -.3937926
                           Technical (semi-)professionals     -1.031447   .2418116    -4.27   0.000    -1.505389   -.5575051
                                    Small business owners     -.5830884   .2135812    -2.73   0.006      -1.0017   -.1644769
          Self-employed professionals and large employers     -.8497543   .2564773    -3.31   0.001    -1.352441    -.347068
                                                  class8_r  
                                                            
                                                   lrscale      .362057   .0160978    22.49   0.000     .3305059    .3936081
                                                    female    -.1585872   .1802802    -0.88   0.379      -.51193    .1947556
                                                   fathimg      -.34626   .3364902    -1.03   0.303    -1.005769    .3132487
                                                            
                              Farm or home in countryside     -.1207003   .3316029    -0.36   0.716      -.77063    .5292293
                                          Country village     -.0832783   .1864499    -0.45   0.655    -.4487134    .2821569
                                       Town or small city       -.07298   .1166035    -0.63   0.531    -.3015188    .1555587
                         Suburbs or outskirts of big city      .1271367   .2168863     0.59   0.558    -.2979527    .5522261
                                                   domicil  
                                                            
                                                  Over 60      -.144768   .1480581    -0.98   0.328    -.4349565    .1454206
                                                    45-60     -.2137168   .1494933    -1.43   0.153    -.5067183    .0792848
                                                    30-44     -.0030356   .1326469    -0.02   0.982    -.2630187    .2569475
                                                    agecat  
                                                            
                                                       NO      1.233496   .0723677    17.04   0.000     1.091658    1.375334
                                                       NL      1.314638   .0517954    25.38   0.000      1.21312    1.416155
                                                       FI     -2.723193   .0648147   -42.02   0.000    -2.850227   -2.596158
                                                       DK      .4621945   .0323676    14.28   0.000     .3987551    .5256339
                                                       DE     -2.699241     .07006   -38.53   0.000    -2.836556   -2.561926
                                                       CH      1.954576   .0840952    23.24   0.000     1.789752    2.119399
                                                       BE      .5033347   .0177895    28.29   0.000      .468468    .5382014
                                                  cntrynum  
                                                                                                                            
                                              voteradright        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                           Robust
                                                                                                                            
                                                                                (Std. Err. adjusted for 8 clusters in cntry)
Log pseudolikelihood = -2265.3662               Pseudo R2         =     0.2283
                                                Prob > chi2       =          .
                                                Wald chi2(6)      =          .
Logistic regression                             Number of obs     =      9,375
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Green 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     _cons     .1750787   .2739568     0.64   0.523    -.3618669    .7120242
                                                            
                         Very difficult on present income      -.072606   .3292593    -0.22   0.825    -.7179423    .5727304
                              Difficult on present income      .2096259    .236999     0.88   0.376    -.2548836    .6741355
                                 Coping on present income     -.0076434   .0927655    -0.08   0.934    -.1894604    .1741735
                                                   hincfel  
                                                            
                                                     union    -.1362324   .0976215    -1.40   0.163    -.3275669    .0551021
                                                            
                 Tertiary education completed (ISCED 5-6)      .5380712   .1108864     4.85   0.000     .3207378    .7554045
Post-secondary non-tertiary education completed (ISCED 4)      .1082079   .3329117     0.33   0.745    -.5442871    .7607029
            Upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3)      .3345348   .0713526     4.69   0.000     .1946864    .4743833
          Less than lower secondary education (ISCED 0-1)     -.6182375   .3095063    -2.00   0.046    -1.224859   -.0116163
                                                   edulvla  
                                                            
                                          Service workers      .5606583   .1842638     3.04   0.002     .1995078    .9218087
                      Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals      1.124702   .2156085     5.22   0.000     .7021166    1.547287
                                                   Clerks       .376033   .1349885     2.79   0.005     .1114604    .6406057
                                     (Associate) managers      .3634017   .2119652     1.71   0.086    -.0520424    .7788458
                           Technical (semi-)professionals      .3564018    .125449     2.84   0.004     .1105262    .6022773
                                    Small business owners      .5938029   .1775227     3.34   0.001     .2458648    .9417409
          Self-employed professionals and large employers      .6047521   .3256471     1.86   0.063    -.0335045    1.243009
                                                  class8_r  
                                                            
                                                   lrscale    -.3732828   .0545924    -6.84   0.000    -.4802819   -.2662837
                                                    female     .2652484    .161307     1.64   0.100    -.0509075    .5814042
                                                   fathimg    -.1694192   .1690038    -1.00   0.316    -.5006606    .1618221
                                                            
                              Farm or home in countryside     -.4304582   .2771636    -1.55   0.120    -.9736888    .1127724
                                          Country village     -.5504612   .1872106    -2.94   0.003    -.9173874   -.1835351
                                       Town or small city     -.5099375   .0962757    -5.30   0.000    -.6986345   -.3212405
                         Suburbs or outskirts of big city     -.2204044   .1509855    -1.46   0.144    -.5163305    .0755217
                                                   domicil  
                                                            
                                                  Over 60     -1.572069   .1996548    -7.87   0.000    -1.963385   -1.180752
                                                    45-60     -.9467719   .1472256    -6.43   0.000    -1.235329    -.658215
                                                    30-44     -.5043989   .1147113    -4.40   0.000    -.7292289   -.2795689
                                                    agecat  
                                                            
                                                       SE     -1.709913   .0554949   -30.81   0.000    -1.818681   -1.601145
                                                       NL     -.5873626   .0511065   -11.49   0.000    -.6875296   -.4871956
                                                       IE     -1.104231   .0631864   -17.48   0.000    -1.228074   -.9803879
                                                       GB     -3.099263   .0531587   -58.30   0.000    -3.203452   -2.995074
                                                       FI     -.1757038   .0668556    -2.63   0.009    -.3067384   -.0446691
                                                       DE     -.7914525   .0356383   -22.21   0.000    -.8613024   -.7216027
                                                       CH     -.8894614    .064662   -13.76   0.000    -1.016197   -.7627262
                                                       BE      -.109823   .0302366    -3.63   0.000    -.1690856   -.0505604
                                                  cntrynum  
                                                                                                                            
                                                 votegreen        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                           Robust
                                                                                                                            
                                                                                (Std. Err. adjusted for 9 clusters in cntry)
Log pseudolikelihood = -2624.1464               Pseudo R2         =     0.2033
                                                Prob > chi2       =          .
                                                Wald chi2(7)      =          .
Logistic regression                             Number of obs     =     10,574
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APPENDIX E: PREDICTING RADICAL RIGHT AND GREEN VOTING IN 2014, FULL 
RESULTS WITH COUNTRY DUMMIES 
 
Radical Right  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           _cons    -2.729918   .7046696    -3.87   0.000    -4.111044   -1.348791
                                           union    -.1314403   .1456524    -0.90   0.367    -.4169136    .1540331
                                                  
               Very difficult on present income      .9020275   .4252555     2.12   0.034      .068542    1.735513
                    Difficult on present income      .6046382   .1680781     3.60   0.000     .2752112    .9340652
                       Coping on present income      .3431383   .1120488     3.06   0.002     .1235268    .5627499
                                         hincfel  
                                                  
                                       Tertiary     -1.046442   .1698171    -6.16   0.000    -1.379277   -.7136068
                                 Post-Secondary      -.293485   .2608379    -1.13   0.261    -.8047179    .2177479
                                Upper Secondary     -.1357432    .129511    -1.05   0.295    -.3895801    .1180938
                                        Primary     -.5064086   .1402331    -3.61   0.000    -.7812604   -.2315567
                                        educ2014  
                                                  
                                Service workers     -.2176635   .2207178    -0.99   0.324    -.6502625    .2149355
            Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals     -1.478138   .2684766    -5.51   0.000    -2.004343   -.9519337
                                         Clerks     -.5226317   .2615661    -2.00   0.046    -1.035292   -.0099716
                           (Associate) managers     -.9022925   .1983362    -4.55   0.000    -1.291024   -.5135606
                 Technical (semi-)professionals      -.414726   .1429446    -2.90   0.004    -.6948923   -.1345597
                          Small business owners     -1.109528   .2365775    -4.69   0.000    -1.573211   -.6458448
Self-employed professionals and large employers     -1.650467   .4332042    -3.81   0.000    -2.499531   -.8014022
                                        class8_r  
                                                  
                                         lrscale     .2949538   .0613278     4.81   0.000     .1747534    .4151541
                                          female    -.3141619   .1451354    -2.16   0.030     -.598622   -.0297018
                                         fathimg    -.8366089   .1415201    -5.91   0.000    -1.113983   -.5592345
                                                  
                    Farm or home in countryside      .4055687   .1609303     2.52   0.012     .0901512    .7209862
                                Country village      .2507404   .1624723     1.54   0.123    -.0676995    .5691802
                             Town or small city      .2250076   .1430631     1.57   0.116    -.0553909     .505406
               Suburbs or outskirts of big city      .2933281   .0723819     4.05   0.000     .1514623     .435194
                                         domicil  
                                                  
                                        Over 60     -.0530056   .2445222    -0.22   0.828    -.5322603    .4262492
                                          45-60     -.0313869   .2711909    -0.12   0.908    -.5629113    .5001374
                                          30-44      .2551706   .2782033     0.92   0.359    -.2900978     .800439
                                          agecat  
                                                  
                                             NO     -.0629036   .0805231    -0.78   0.435    -.2207259    .0949187
                                             NL     -.6417911    .058777   -10.92   0.000     -.756992   -.5265903
                                             FR     -.1328804   .0583521    -2.28   0.023    -.2472485   -.0185123
                                             FI     -.0524393   .0915025    -0.57   0.567    -.2317808    .1269022
                                             DK     -.2253137   .1055091    -2.14   0.033    -.4321078   -.0185196
                                             CH      .4831602   .0863289     5.60   0.000     .3139587    .6523617
                                             BE      -1.84873   .0810843   -22.80   0.000    -2.007652   -1.689807
                                        cntrynum  
                                                                                                                  
                                    voteradright        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                 Robust
                                                                                                                  
                                                                      (Std. Err. adjusted for 8 clusters in cntry)
Log pseudolikelihood = -2502.9419               Pseudo R2         =     0.1650
                                                Prob > chi2       =          .
                                                Wald chi2(6)      =          .
Logistic regression                             Number of obs     =      8,104
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Greens 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           _cons    -.2388482   .1969347    -1.21   0.225    -.6248332    .1471368
                                                  
               Very difficult on present income      .4486291   .2165895     2.07   0.038     .0241215    .8731367
                    Difficult on present income     -.2245011    .140563    -1.60   0.110    -.4999996    .0509974
                       Coping on present income     -.0242062   .0923988    -0.26   0.793    -.2053045    .1568921
                                         hincfel  
                                                  
                                           union    -.1764768   .0905726    -1.95   0.051    -.3539957    .0010422
                                                  
                                       Tertiary      .8564564   .1985081     4.31   0.000     .4673877    1.245525
                                 Post-Secondary      .3636964   .1757568     2.07   0.039     .0192194    .7081733
                                Upper Secondary       .109536   .1584298     0.69   0.489    -.2009808    .4200527
                                        Primary     -.8136188   .2953205    -2.76   0.006    -1.392436   -.2348013
                                        educ2014  
                                                  
                                Service workers      .1655441   .1726301     0.96   0.338    -.1728046    .5038929
            Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals      .6706012   .1041379     6.44   0.000     .4664946    .8747078
                                         Clerks       .257023   .1984394     1.30   0.195    -.1319111    .6459571
                           (Associate) managers      .4279079   .1123465     3.81   0.000     .2077127     .648103
                 Technical (semi-)professionals      .5639723   .2026295     2.78   0.005     .1668257    .9611189
                          Small business owners      .6266802   .1742976     3.60   0.000     .2850631    .9682973
Self-employed professionals and large employers      1.045146   .2763383     3.78   0.000     .5035333     1.58676
                                        class8_r  
                                                  
                                         lrscale    -.3245136    .031119   -10.43   0.000    -.3855057   -.2635215
                                          female     .2597306    .147794     1.76   0.079    -.0299404    .5494016
                                         fathimg     .0400229   .1233057     0.32   0.745    -.2016517    .2816976
                                                  
                    Farm or home in countryside     -.7266536   .3820269    -1.90   0.057    -1.475413    .0221053
                                Country village     -.3576591   .1505671    -2.38   0.018    -.6527653    -.062553
                             Town or small city     -.3134127   .1413187    -2.22   0.027    -.5903923   -.0364331
               Suburbs or outskirts of big city     -.1954117   .1284493    -1.52   0.128    -.4471678    .0563443
                                         domicil  
                                                  
                                        Over 60     -1.166542   .1967507    -5.93   0.000    -1.552166   -.7809174
                                          45-60     -.4201041   .1523447    -2.76   0.006    -.7186943   -.1215139
                                          30-44     -.3335476   .1626524    -2.05   0.040    -.6523404   -.0147549
                                          agecat  
                                                  
                                             SE     -.7271928   .0442503   -16.43   0.000    -.8139217   -.6404638
                                             NL     -1.518143    .038014   -39.94   0.000    -1.592649   -1.443637
                                             IE     -2.236223   .0914937   -24.44   0.000    -2.415547   -2.056899
                                             GB     -2.453477   .0486084   -50.47   0.000    -2.548748   -2.358207
                                             FR     -.8738105   .0518708   -16.85   0.000    -.9754754   -.7721457
                                             FI     -.0724005   .0776506    -0.93   0.351    -.2245929    .0797918
                                             DE     -.6529966   .0390799   -16.71   0.000    -.7295917   -.5764014
                                             CH      .2025651    .057245     3.54   0.000     .0903669    .3147632
                                             BE     -.5438137    .050482   -10.77   0.000    -.6427566   -.4448708
                                        cntrynum  
                                                                                                                  
                                       votegreen        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                 Robust
                                                                                                                  
                                                                     (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in cntry)
Log pseudolikelihood = -2869.0794               Pseudo R2         =     0.1927
                                                Prob > chi2       =          .
                                                Wald chi2(8)      =          .
Logistic regression                             Number of obs     =     11,376
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